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Abstract 
A Macroeconomic growth model is set forth to distinguish among 
Keynesian, Marxian and balance of payments constrained unemployment, 
as well as to clarify the roles of productivity growth, factor substi-
tution and structural disequilibrium in affecting the growth of employ-
ment,, The model is then used to assess the effects on employment of the 
typical kind of protection system found in less developed countries. 
Protection of this sort is found to be inimical to the growth of employ-
ment because of adverse influences on productivity, factor proportions, 
saving and the balance of paymentso 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Disappointing growth of employment in the "modern" sector 
has "been a common experience of less developed countries (LDCs) over the 
past two decades of more or less conscious planning for development. 
Most attempts to explain this phenomenon have focused on factor substitution 
within the framework of neoclassical production theory,, While this 
approach has "been rewarding it leaves some important questions outside the 
analysiso What determines, or constrains, the rate of investment for the 
whole economy? What is the effect of generally rising productivity on 
employment? How do trade and protection policies affect the demand for 
labor? These questions can best be answered, I think, in a macroeconomic 
framework of analysis. Moreover, the importance of factor substitution and 
its relation to other elements in the determination of employment groxrth can 
be further illuminated in such an analytical framework. A macroeconomic 
approach is suggested, therefore, as a complement to the essentially 
microeconomic analyses of employment growth that are based on production 
theory. 
With this in mind, I will set forth a very simple macroeconomic 
growth model that is designed to bring out the importance of diagnosing 
correctly the ruling constraint on investment, as well as to clarify the 
roles of both productivity growth and irt jrnational trade and payments 
policies in influencing employment creat on. While the model resembles 
Harrod-Domar models, the focus is on the relation of capital formation to 
the growth of employment rather tl'an to the growth of output; and 
disequilibrium rather than stead; —state growth is emphasized. 
IIo THE CLOSED ECONOMY MODEL 1 
Let the "natural stock of capital" be defined as 
Kn+ = ktLt C1) 
where L is the labor force and k is the aggregate capital-labor ratio„ 
The latter depends on the state of knowledge and the structure of the 
economy, both of which are assumed to be functions of time, as well as on 
factor prices, which are reserved as policy variables and, therefore, are 
taken as given. This last assumption is in sharp contrast to that made 
in so-called "neoclassical" growth models in which growth equilibrium is 
1 This model is essentially the same as that in the writer's 
"Economic Framework of a Theory of Growth", Economic Journal, March 1958. 
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assured through automatic adjustments of factor prices. The view here, 
which I think is more realistic, is that while factor prices do affect 
factor proportions, they do not adjust automatically in an equilibrating 
fashion,, Moreover, they are very much influenced by government policies,. 
Differentiating equation (l) with respect to time yields the 
"natural rate of capital formation" 
O / \ K = kL + Lk (2) n v 
where a variable with a dot over it is the derivative of that variable 
with respect to time, and the t subscripts have been omitted for con-0 
venienceo Substituting I (investment) for K and re-arranging, equation 
(2) can be rewritten as e 
In = k (|L + L) (2a) 
The expression in parentheses I call the "rate of emergence of free labor", 
o 
its two components being the time rate of growth of the labor force (L) 
and the time rate of laborsaving (~L)Thus there is both a Malthusian 
and a Marxian source of the free labor supply. The affinity of the free 
labour supply, itself, to Marx's "reserve army of the unemployed" should 
be evidento 
The rate of laborsaving can be interpreted in the following way0 
A given (value of) capital may require less labor over time as knowledge 
progresses and the structure of the economy changes0 That is, technical 
progress may be biased in favor of the use of capital against labor and 
structural change may involve the shifting of employment toward more 
capital-intensive sectors0 The V-or "saved", together with L, will simply 
swell the reserve army of unenplqyed unless capital formation is at a 
sufficiently high rate (given k) to absorb ito The natural rate of capital 
formation is, thensthe rate that would prevent the reserve army from growing -
ioe», one that implies a rate of absorption of free labor that just matches 
the rate of emergence of free labor0 
I am passing over difficult problems of measurement anl aggre-
gation because I have nothing to contribute to their solution0 I c^uid 
assume that a single commodity is produced with different techniques in 
"traditional" and "modern" sectors; and that it is exported in exchange for 
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machines at given world prices* I do not think that this helps very much, 
however. One either believes that simple aggregative models of this sort 
are useful in suggesting implications for the real world or one does not. 
For the questions raised above in the introduction I think that this one 
is useful. 
There is one element of additional realism that should be 
added, however. In general we cannot assume that the capital-labor ratio 
at which new investment is taking place ~ call it k* - is equal to k, the 
average for the economy. Insofar as new machines are more laborsaving 
than older vintages and the modern sector is growing more rapidly than the 
traditional, k* will be greater than k. Hence we should rewrite (2a) to 
read 
In = k* (|L + L) (2b) 
Up to this point the analysis is classical, or Marxian, in that 
deficiency of aggregate demand as a cause of unemployment has been ignored. 
"The demand for labor is not the demand for commodities" but is, rather, 
capital formation. Since Keynes' General Theory we no longer accept John 
Stuart Mill's famous dictum. But introducing the demand for labor via the 
demand for commodities does not supplant the classical demand via capital 
formation. Rather another equilibrium condition is added. Not only must 
capital formation create jobs, but it must also be at the appropriate level 
(given the saving function) to create an aggregate demand for goods equal 
to the supply of goods those jobs are capable of providing. This gives us a 
"warranted rate of capital formation" equal to saving at full capacity output. 
Iw = S* (3) 
If we let S* = s ;*, where Y* is full capacity output; and if we define p 
(for labor proi ctivity) as then (3) can be rewritten as Jj 
Iw = spL (3a) 
I am avoiding the term, "full employment", for obvious reasons. 
"Full capacity" is not much better, but what is meant is that point (or 
range) beyond which excess demand inflation becomes serious. Admittedly 
that is not very precise, but the lack of precision is not very important 
for the discussion that follows. At full capacity in LDCs there could be 
considerable unemployment and underemployment of labor. 
Growth equilibrium requires,then9 that the actual rate of 
capital formation (i ) be equal both to the natural rate and. to the cl 
warranted rate® 
9 
Ia = k* (|L + L) = spL (4) 
The parallel to the Harrod-Domar model is obvious. There investment 
plays a dual role as a critical element in aggregate demand and as a 
creator of productive capacity. Here, similarly, it is a critical 
element of demand and a creator of jobs. This way of looking at it 
emphasizes that employment requires two conditions to be met: (l) that 
the job has been created, and (2) that there is a demand for the job. 
The distinction between the classical (and Marxian) demand for labor 
and the Keynesian demand for labor is important, as we shall see shortly, 
in distinguishing the problem of unemployment in LDCs from that in 
industrialized countries0 
Finally, the close relation of my natural and warranted rates 
of capital formation to Harrod's natural and warranted rates of output 
grovrth is also obvious. However, the model set forth here has, I think, 
three advantages for the purpose at hand. First, the focus is on employ-
ment. Second, it is more convenient for differentiating various disequi-
librium caseso Third, it helps to clarify the role of productivity grovrth. 
In the Harrod model the latter is a proxy for laborsaving, which is 
legitimate only if the capital-output ratio is, in fact, constants 
Returning to equation (4)? if we divide through by L, we can 
state the same condition for a given labor force and also show the 
relationships conveniently in Figure 10 
© ® 
= k* + £) = sp (4a) 
L 
Let g represent the expression in parentheses - the proportional time rate 
of emergence of free labor (the flow into the reserve army) - so that the 
natural rate of capital formation is simply k*g. The parameters k*,g, s and 
p are represented in Figure 1 by the slopes of the lines so identified. 
The particular case represented in the diagram has I^^I^o 
If the actual rate of investment, I , were held at I . ,j.e Keynesian a w 
criterion would be satisfied (aggregate demand would equal full capacity 

aggregate supply); but I would fall short of I , implying that the rate 
of job creation was inadequate for the rate of emergence of free labor. 
The reserve army of unemployed would grox\r. On the other hand, to raise 
I in an attempt to speed up the creation of jobs would open an infla-3/ 
tionary gap between aggregate supply and demand,, 
This makes very explicit Joan Robinson's distinction between 
Marxian and Keynesian unemployment. When 1 = 1 ^J. , the former is a w n 
growing while the latter is absents This is the typical LDC 
case, where 
population growth is relatively rapid, opportunities for laborsaving 
through structural change are seemingly endless, and a vast backlog of 
laborsaving techniques is still largely untapped. More developed 
countries, in contrast, are nearer to the frontiers of technology, 
generally have slower rates of population growth, and have largely 
completed the transformation from a traditional agricultural economy to a 
modern industrial one. This means that the parameter g, the rate of 
emergence of free labor, will vary greatly between less and more developed 
countries. On the other hand, one does not find capital-output ratios 
(k/p) greatly lower nor saving ratios (s) greatly higher in LDCs. Yet it 
is one or both of these that is required to offset the difference in g if 
the two sets of countries were to be in similar positions relative to grovrth 
equilibrium,, 
If this is right it provides a very good reason for not using 
equilibrium growth models. I have already indicated my belief that LDGs 
typically fall in the Marxian case of disequilibrium. I believe also that 
most developed countries, at least when they are not spending gfeat sums on 
armaments, fall in the Keynesian case - though that judgement has no relevance 
for the present discussion. The distinction between the two kinds of unemploy-
ment is very relevant, however, and its importance becomes evident when one 
considers remedies. When I > I , what is needed are higher values for s and n w 
p, or lower values for k* and g. That is, a higher saving propensity, 
greater productivity, slower population grovrth, and lower capital intensity, 
represent ways of curing Marxian unemployment. VJhen I > 1 , exactly opposite w n 
changes are called for (though faster p^ dilation grovrth and lov^ er productivity 
would represent particularly bad remedies on virtually all other grounds). 
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Note particularly the role of p - labor productivity. In the 
LDC case a rise in p, per se, is helpful in solving the problem of 
unemployment. The reason is that it means increased output and saving. 
Of course, this holds only if the other parameters do not simultaneously 
move adversely to offset the favorable effect. In particular what we 
assume about k is important; for we often think of a rise in k as being 
responsible for a rise in p. When this is the case (assuming "well-behaved 
production functions") the change is adverse to employment, since p will 
rise. It is these cases that are usually assumed when p is used as a 
proxy for lc to measure laborsaving. There are, however, many opportunities 
for raising p without raising k in the same proportion and it is unfortunate, 
therefore, that productivity increase is sometimes equated with laborsaving. 
Indeed, this could tend to bias employment policies against the idea of 
raising labor productivity when some productivity-increasing measures might 
be very helpful to employment creation. 
Yet another implicit assumption that often lies behind the bias 
against productivity increase is that there is a demand limit on output. 
Then higher productivity automatically means less employment. The model 
shows clearly, however, that a demand limitation should not prevail for 
countries with Marxian unemployment. A rise in productivity, cet. par., 
raises the level of the constraining warranted rate of investment, permit-
ting a rise in actual investment just to the level needed to maintain 
aggregate demand equal to full capacity aggregate supply. So K jynesian 
equilibrium is preserved while the growth of Marxian unemployment is 
reduced. In contrast, when the natural rate of investment is the constraint 
(Keynesian case) a rise in productivity does nothing to ease the constraint, 
but simply puts the warranted rate further out of reach. (Of course there 
are ideal measures that could be implemented to take advantage of the produc-
tivity increase, but these are the same measures that were inedsquately 
implerr ited before to consign the country to the Keynesian case of disequi-
libriui «) Having said all of this, I recognize, nonetheless, that LDCs often 
appear i face a pseudo-Keynesian situation where deficiency of aggregate 
demand limits employment and. output. Analysis of this situation requires 
extending the model to the case of an open economy. 
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It is assumed in what follows that countries are typically in some kind 
of disequilibrium rather than in golden age equilibrium; and it is further 
assumed that LDCs tend to fall on the side of Marxian unemployment and 
excess demand inflation. 
III. THE OPEN ECONOMY MODEL 
The model cannot begin to be useful for our purposes, however, 
until we extend it to the open economy case. The natural rate of capital 
formation remains unchanged, but the warranted rate must be modified and 
a new rate added - the balance of payments constrained rate of capital 
formation, I. . 
To keep the model as simple as possible, I simply add exogenously 
determined levels of exports (X) and foreign capital inflow (P), as well as 
an import propensity (m). Then I , which is still the rate of investment w 
that meets the Keynesian condition of aggregate demand equal to full-
capacity aggregate supply, becomes 
Iw = (s + m) pL - X (5) 
That is, the warranted rate of investment is equal to the sum of saving 
and imports at full capacity less exports. The balance of payments 
constrained rate of investment, in turn, is 
T = s 2LJLF + p (6) b m v ' 
X 4- F 
Since — - — is the balance of payments constrained level of output, is 
simply domestic saving at that level of output plus the foreign capital 
inflow. These can easily be interpreted also with the aid of a familiar 
diagram which is incorporated in Figure 2 (p.5) in the upper right-hand 
quadrant. I is seen as that level of investment which, given s, will 
determine a line, I - sY, which will intersect mY-X at Y = Y*. I, is that 
W D 
level of investment which, given s, will determine a line, - sY, which will intersect m Y - X where the latter (the trade deficit) just equals F, 
the given foreign capital inflow0 
Note particularly that F influences only while a change in the 
trade balance (via a change in m or X) will affect both and I , but in 
opposite directions. An improvement in the trade balance, for example, will 
lower I and raise I, ; and the two will coincide if mY - X intersects FF w b 
where Y = Y*0 
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The case depicted in the diagram is one where X b < T o put 
investment at the warranted rate would mean a "balance of payments deficit. 
To avoid the deficit, investment must be held below the Keynesian 
equilibrium levels This implies unemployment due to deficiency of demand* 
I prefer not to call this Keynesian unemployment, however, because it is 
not amenable to Keynesian remedies (taking the balance of payments as a 
constraint)«, It is I, 9 not I , that constrains I below I 0 Hence I call D H B» W 
this "balance of payments (BOP) unemployment"0 
There is another kind of balance of payments unemployment that 
is very common. This occurs when, instead of reducing investment, the 
government tightens import controls and a shortage of imported inputs reduces 
output capacity and employment by a supply multiplier. This could be shown 
by a shift to the left of Y*» 
To complete the picture in Figure 2 for the LDC case, I have shown 
I > 1 o The implication is that a balance of payments constraint means LDCs 
can suffer simultaneously from Marxian unemployment and unemployment that is 
due to deficiency of demand - in this case, BOP unemployment0 
With no change in the other parameters, L could be raised to I 
D W 
by increasing F. This would permit a rise in I to reduce both Marxian and cl 
BOP unemploymento Beyond that a further increase in F could raise to I . 
A rise in actual investment to I would no longer be constrained by balance of 
payments considerations, but now only by the inflation barrier. To remove the 
latter, mY - X must be shifted upward - i.e., some combination of reduced 
exports and increased imports is required. (l rule out an increase in s as an 
alternative since8 if that were possible, the country would not properly fall 
in the LDC category for the purpose of the discussion here)0 
In contrast, an improvement in the trade balance (downward shift 
of mY - X) can bring to equality with Iw only at a lower level of the latter. 
As noted above, the two will coincide when mY - X intersects FF at Y = Y*. 
Beyond that an improvement in the trade balance is simply inflationary. The 
difference in the two cases is, of course, that the only additional real 
resources made available for investment by improving the trade balance are 
represented by the additional domestic saving from the expansion of output 
to full capacity, while the increased F adds to this the availability of more 
resources from abroad. In this context it is evident that trade is not a 
substitute for aid, But, of course^ in this context the other parameters are 
fixed. In fairness to the proponents of trade as a substitute for aid, it 
must be noted that this is just what they do not assume^ 
I will refrain from pursuing this case any further at this point 
since the main purpose here is to establish an analytical framework. There 
are, indeed, 75 cases of different relationships among I , I , I and I, , a w n D 
only one of which represents equilibrium,, Thus there are 74 cases of growth 
disequilibrium involving different combinations of BOP deficit or surplus, 
three kinds of unemployment (BOP, Keynesian and Marxian) and three kinds of 
inflation (BOP, wage-r>rice and excess demand). (For precise definitions of 
these, see Appendix j „) 'This is clearly unmanageable, but fortunately the 
number can be reduced ..ujstantially by omitting cases where remedies are 
relatively simple (such as pure inflation and deflation cases similar to 
those omitted in the closed economy context). This, plus the fact that less 
than half of the cases are relevant to LDGs and the assumption that LDCs find 
it easy to avoid BOP inflation by raising imports (at least in the long run), 
makes it possib"1 o narrow down to six cases that are of primary interest here. 
(See Appendix I! ) I should add, perhaps, that the number of interesting 
developed countrt jases cannot be reduced so easily. I should add also that 
many of the LDC cases that I have suggested could be omitted would be of great 
interest for other purposeso 
In any case, my aim here is not to present a number of cases but, 
first, to emphasize the variety of kinds of structural disequilibria that are 
possible and the contrasting remedies they requirej and, second, to provide a 
theoretical framework that can be applied on an ad hoc basis to questions about 
the relation of protection to employment. For that the diagram in Figure 2 i3 
useful. It is the same, of course, as that in Figure I except that the upper 
right-hand quadrant has been modified to allow for the influences of exports, 
imports and the inflow of foreign capitals 
IV. PROTECTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Protection should encompass all of those measures that favor 
domestic industries at the expense of rival foreign suppliers in both home and 
world markets. Japan stands out among the countries that appear to give as much 
attention to protecting their industries in export markets as at home. The 
typical LDC, in contrast, protects its industries only in the home market 
through tariffs and import restrictions without balancing subsidies to exports. 
Accordingly LDC protection is usually associated with an import substitution 
bias in industrialization strategy. It is this typical kind of protection that 
is considered here. 
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Since I have described -this kind of protection and discussed its 
shortcomings at some length elsewhere, I shall not dwell on that here. 
Before turning to the application of the model described above to the question 
of the effects of protection on employment, however, I would like to comment 
briefly on the meaning of protection and on the origins and character of 
typical LDG protection systems© 
The most important point to emphasize about protection is that it 
is relative. It is impossible to protect every activity equally. To attempt 
to do so would result in no protection at all. Suppose, for example, that a 
ten per cent duty were imposed on all imports (in a situatim o-f 1 free 
trade equilibrium), and a matching ten per cent subsidy is awarded to all 
exports. Even invisibles would be included so that there is equal protection 
for each activity. Immediately prices and values added would be higher for 
all traded goods. There would be an incentive for them to expand vis a vis non-
traded goods, but as they did so a surplus would arise in the balance of pay-
ments. Assuming that the country does not want to provide unrequited exports 
to the world, the value of its currency must rise. Equilibriurr tfould be attained 
only when the appreciation reached ten per cent - i.e., when it has nullified 
the effects of the tariffs and subsidies. "Net protection", defined as the rate 
of protection less the proportion by which the equilibrium value of the currency 
is raised by the whole protection system, would be zero for all activities, just 
as in the case of free trade© 
Consider now the case where the ten per cent tariff is not matched 
by equivalent subsidies to exports© Again the currency must appreciate, but 
in this case the appreciation will normally fall short of the tariff percentage, 
leaving a residual of net protection. The reason is that export earnings will 
normally decline as the currency appreciates so that the appreciation need not 
fully erase the incentive to import substitution© 
Looking at this under less normal circumstances, suppose that the 
elasticity of supply of exports were zero, or the elasticity of demand for 
exports were unity© Then the currency would have to appreciate by the full 
percentage of the tariff rate, erasing completely any protective effect. Under 
these circumstances net protection for import substitutes would be zero for any 
3 "Import Substitution as an Industrialization Strategy", Philippine 
--'conomi c Journal, IJ66 j and "The Role of Protection in Industrialization 
Policy: with Particular Reference to Kenya," Eastern Africa Economic Review, June 
1972 c 
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level of tariffs! And if the elasticity of demand for exports were less than 
unity, net protection for import substitutes would be negative no matter how 
high the (uniform) tariff was set. In general, the proportion by which the 
appreciation reduces protection is greater the less responsive are export 
earnings, since more of the adjustment is left to imports. Ironically, however, 
a low export response is sometimes used as an argument for protection. 
In the normal case, however, there would be some positive net 
protection for import substitutes. If we now consider, more realistically, 
that we do not usually have uniform tariffs - that rates range from very high 
to zero - we can discover cases of negative net protection without regard to 
penalties from protection on inputs. An export good, for example, or duty-free 
materials or machinery, would have negative net protection (both nominal and 
effective) just to the extent of the undervaluation of foreign exchange. 
I have devoted a little to this point, first, because it dramatizes 
the penalty on exports, or on potential domestic substitutes for low-duty imports 
that protection systems usually impose. Moreover, it helps to explain why pro-
tection systems often give greater encouragement to the processing of foreign 
primary and intermediate inputs than to the processing of domestic materials. 
It is common, indeed, for foreign supplies to enter at less than free-trade 
equilibrium prices9 wing to the combination of low duty plus (more than 
matching) undervalued ion of foreign exchange that the higher duties on finished 
products defend. Finally9 it is especially important to note that, for the 
same reason, capital equipment typically also enters at prices that are kept 
artificially below free trade levels by the system of protection* 
Another important implication of this is that it is not possible 
to treat the whole economy as deserving protection on the ground that every 
industry is an "infant" vis a vis the developed world. The more broadly (equal) 
protection is extended, the more it is diluted for each activity. In practice 
this means that, if it is decided to accord protection for infant industry 
reasons, the policy will be more effective if selectively applied to a few most 
deserving of the status, rather than broadly extended to every "pioneer" 
industry. 
Turning from protection in theory to protection in practice, we 
should note that it is very common for an LDC protection system to have had 
its genesis in a balance of payments crisis. Typically import or exchange 
controls were first adopted as a temporary expedient on the reasonable assump-
tion that these would have an immediate effect on foreign exchange use, while 
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other more fundament a remedies could be expected to take longer to be effective, 
These temporary measures very often have evolved into a strategy for industna-
Xization9 however9 for at least three reasons0 First, they tend to be highly 
effective in controlling the balance of payments in the short run9 their 
deficiencies becoming apparent only after the system has become well entrenched© 
Second, even if the government had every intention of employing import controls 
solely as an emergency measure until more fundamental remedies could be 
implemented, the disappearance of the crisis makes it easy to neglect long-run 
solutions in favor of more immediately pressing problems in other areas of 
policy© Thirds vested interests soon develop 'behind the protection offered by 
the controlso 
The pattern of industrialization that follows carrys the stamp of 
the priorities determined in the balance of payments crisis© It is natural, 
in such an emergency, to ration foreign exchange in accordance with use prio-
rities© "Essentials" are liberally imported and "non-essentials" are restricted 
without regard for the protective effect. Increasingly, as domestic manufacture 
of consumption goods expands9 the essential category comes to mean largely the 
components, materials and equipment needed as inputs in the consumption goods 
industries© So there develops the familiar pattern of "escalating rates of 
protection", highest on consumption goods (especially high on the least 
essential ones), lower on intermediate goods, and usually lowest on raw 
materials and capital equipment© The result is that consumption goods may enjoy 
extremely high rates of effective protection, while exports, capital goods and 
raw materials suffer negative protection© The pattern of use priorities is 
exactly reversed so lar as protection of domestic production is concerned,, 
Vo PROTECTION AND EMPLOYMENT 
We should not, of course, expect protection systems of the kind 
described above to be designed to favor employment© What is ironic, however,, 
is that unemployment can be a long continuing problem and nothing drastic is 
done - no drastic population policy, no drastic- factor proportions policy© 
But a balance of payments problem gets immediate attention and often decisive -
if crude - action0 The emergency balance of payments policies then eventually 
become rationalized as industrialization and employment policies with conse-
quences that are often detrimental to employment growth0 
To see why this might be so, let us return to the growth model that 
was described in section III above0 Consider first just the effect of a 
balance of payments constraint, as pictured in Figure 2© Suppose that the 
remedy adopted is to hold I to the level of I, — the classical medicine of 
restricting aggregate demancL The result would be BOP unemployment from the 
deficiency of aggregate demand plus growing Marxian unemployment owing to the 
gap between I and This means that, because of the foreign exchange 
constraint, some jobs already created must remain unfilled; and, in addition, 
saving potential must be -underutilized so that the rate of creation of new 
jobs is also below potentialo (Even without a balance of payments constraint, 
of course, the potential for new job creation would be only I , which is 
below I , the rate needed to keep the reserve army from growing.) 
A better alternative might appear to be a reduction of consumption -
i.e., a rise in s. While this would not eliminate BOP unemployment, conceivably 
could be raised to the level of eliminating the growth of Marxian 
unemployment. (The slope of the line, — sY, would be increased until coin-
cided with In°) Of course this would simultaneously raise Iw above I , taking 
the country out of the defined realm of LDC cases. "While this might be possible 
in a poor country with an extremely powerful authoritarian regime, I prefer to 
rule it out as a practical option here0 
It seems, in any case, that there should be a strong incentive to 
seek alternatives to depressing investment or forcing down consumption. A rise 
in P, as was indicated earlier, would permit investment to rise to I and 
beyond to If but such an amount of foreign capital may not be available on 
acceptable terms0 
What is left are trade policies. Shifting m Y - X sufficiently 
downward could eliminate BOP unemployment and somewhat 3duce the growth of 
Marxian unemployment, given the other parameters. But there are many ways to 
influence m Y - X and the other parameters are not likely to remain fixed. 
Rather they are likely to respond in different ways to alternative trade 
policies<> 
The evaluation of a particular form of trade policy, such as 
typical. LDC protection with its import substitution bias, should accordingly 
be made in terms of its effects on saving, productivity and capital intensity, 
as well as its effect on the "balance of payments. The common argument that, 
while tariffs or import restrictions involve loss of allocative efficiency, they 
are at least employment-creating is, therefore, not necessarily correct. It 
is not simply a matter of trading efficiency for employment. What happens to 
the parameters, p, s and k*t, will determine the growth of Marxian unemployment 
even if the trade balance is improved enough to permit the elimination of BOP 
unemployment. Moreover, there is a .question whether such protection policies 
are effective in the long run even in improving the trade balance. Accordingly, 
I shall try to assess some of the implications for employment of typical LDC 
protection under four headings? the effect on p, the effect on s, the effect 
on k* and the effect on the balance of payments constraint© The model indicates 
that favorable to employment for LDCs would be higher values for p and s, a 
lower value for k* and a level of I, at least equal to I © 
D W 
The effect on p is straight-forward, I think0 Empirical studies 
of LDC protection systems almost invariably indicate a very wide range of 
effective rates of protection, implying that some import substitution indust-
ries require far more resources to save a unit of foreign exchange at the 
margin than do others, or than do exports to earn a unit of foreign exchange 
even when terms of trade effects are counted*. The resource cost of balancing 
the foreign exchange budget is likely, therefore, to be much greater than, it 
need be and this waste of resources means a lower pQ 
It is likely that p is lower also as a result of the blunting of 
the forces of competition that protection allows. In most LDCs the size of 
markets is not sufficient to support a number of firms of economical size great 
enough to ensure vigorous domestic competition© Hence, without foreign 
competition, the drive for efficiency and progress is likely to be weaker0 
Moreover, the bias toward many small consumption goods industries, 
horizontally balanced in relation to consumer demand, rather than more 
specialized, more vertically integrated, larger-scale industries that would be 
producing for both domestic and world markets, means that potential gains from 
ecor^ies of scale and from learning-by-doing in the context of more rapid and 
more concentrated ;rowth have been sacrificedo 
Since ail of these adverse effects on p are independent of k, there 
is no labor-using element in them to compensate for the loss in output and, 
therefore, in saving. Hence they mean simply a reduction in I and an intensi-w 
fication of the problem of Marxian unemployment© I stress this because 
inefficiency is sometimes thought to imply "make-work"© Here again the impor-
tance of a correct diagnosis of the ruling constraint on investment is 
emphasized© In the Keynesian case (l S i ), a lower p would mean more employment w^ f n 
in the Marxian case, it would mean more rapidly growing unemployment© As I have 
suggested above, when there is a balance of payments constraint we have a 
"pseudo-Keynesian" case© BOP unemployment, like Keynesian unemployment, can 
be reduced through lower productivity© It is true, then, that if typical LDC 
protection were indeed successful in removing the balance of payments constraint, 
the combination of import substitution and reduced efficiency would dim:"ish BOP 
unemployment© (The slope of p would become steeper, while the slope of mY - X 
would become less steepc) The lower p, by itself, however, would worsen the 
problem of Marxian unemployment0 Any method of improving the trade balance 
which does not involve a reduction (or as great a reduction) in productivity 
would be just as effective in curing BOP unemployment and would be superior 
with respect to Marxian unemployment. In this case, then, less efficiency 
from trade policies does not "make work"o 
I turn now to savingo A few years ago it was popular to argue that 
creating profits through protection was a means of raising saving. By turning 
the terms of trade against the non-protected sectors, income would be shifted 
to profits in manufacturing where there was alleged to be a higher propensity 
to save. This theory is little heard of today because of the dearth of 
evidence to support it. Instead it seems that protection often means ineffi-
ciency, high wages and salaries in the protected sector, and a rapid rise in 
urban consumption rather than higher saving. Inefficiency has meant that, 
although income was transferred from agriculture and other less protected 
sectors, much of it was dissipated in higher costs. Workers, at all levels, 
have been able to capture a substantial portion of the transfer to support high 
urban consumption standards. The emphasis on consumption goods production -
especially of non-essentials - that is induced by the structure of protection 
has meant that the government is unable to take strong measures to curb non-
essential consumption without creating unemployment and excess capacity. 
Finally, the saving propensity in the model, s, may be a function of p (where 
p serves as a proxy for per capita income). If this is so, adverse effects on 
p would have a double effect in reducing saving. 
In some LDCs oonaaierable portion of saving must come from foreign 
private companies. Here the typical system of protection has an especially 
"unfortunate effect. For the system invites foreign companies to invest for 
profits that come from the protection offered, not from using local resources 
efficiently enough to compete with the world. This purely import substitution 
kind of investment is likely to be a one-shot affair, with initial invest just 
enough to meet local market demand. The natural avenues for reinvestment would 
be backward integration and exports; but since these have low or negative 
effective protection it is not surprising that profits are repatriated instead. 
This could have a very substantial effect on the amount of saving that remains 
in the country. An obvious implication is that foreign investment that promises 
exports should be strongly favoredo 
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I should, add that the bias in protection systems against backward 
integration and exports tends to create a poor investment climate (at some stage) 
for all - domestic and foreign capital alike. The implication is that I , the ct 
actual rate of investment, may be held below any of the other constrained rates 
by the constraint of the investment climate. 
Turning now to factor proportions, we can identify a number of ways 
in which protection adversely affects k*. First, and perhaps most obvious 
is the effect of the structure of protection on the domestic prices of imported 
capital goods. Typically they enter, even with modest duties, at below free 
trade equilibrium prices because of the undervaluation of foreign exchange 
that the system of protection defends. 
In addition there is the discouragement to the development of a 
local capital goods industry. This may be adverse to employment iniwo respects. 
First, many capital goods industries are economical at small scale with labor-
intensive methods (though the skill requirements may be relatively high). 
Second, there is some evidence to suggest that a local machinery industry may 
produce machines that are less laborsaving in use, i.e., more in tune with local 
factor proportionso 
Protection tends to bias k* in the wrong direction also by, in 
effect, underwriting - or even intensifying - factor price disequilibrium. 
Permitting via protection a rise in the price of the manufactured product to 
offset high urban wages may only invite further wage increases. These, in turn, 
provide a rationale for more, or at least continuing, protection, and so on. 
Therefore, while protection may neutralize the effect of a dualistic wage 
structure insofar as competition in the domestic market is concerned, it may 
at the same time intensify the bias against the use of labor in manufacturing. 
Another adverse effect on employment through capital intensity may 
come from the bias protection creates in favor of manufacturing based on 
imported inputs over the processing of domestic materials.^ This bias stems 
from one or both of two important consequences of typical LDC protection 
systems. First, there is the general penalty on exports that protection of 
import substitution creates0 Because of wage dualism this is especially 
harmful to manufactured exports. Primary exports, in contrast, often survive 
the effects of the penalty because of lower wages and more flexibility in factor 
prices generally. Thus many LDCs can successfully export primary products at 
an exchange rate that precludes the export of manufactures and permits manufac-
4 The following argument is based on the writer's "A Note on Protection 
and the Processing of Primary Commodities," Working Paper No. 60, Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi, August 1972. 
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turing for the domestic market only behind substantial protection - this 
despite the fact that correction for wage dualism might indicate a real 
comparative advantage in some manufacturing industries. 
The second source of bias against processing is the effect of the 
undervaluation of foreign exchange that protection defends on the relative 
prices of imported inputs and domestic materials. With zero or low duties the 
former can enter below free trade equilibrium prices. This bias depends on the 
assumption that the domestic materials are not exported, however, since if they 
were they would also be undervalued to the same extent0 
To generalize the analysis of the "bias against processing, let us 
consider two goods, a primary commodity and the product resulting from proces-
sing it. The primary commodity might be exported or not, while the processed 
product might also be exported or substituted for imports behind protection. 
We have, then, four possible combinations, each of which can be compared to an 
import substitution industry that is processing imported inputs behind protection. 
First, if the primary commodity is not exported, industries that use 
it as an input will be at a disadvantage vis a. vis import substitution 
industries that use imported inputs because of the undervaluation of foreign 
exchange. This would be true even if the processed product were also a protected 
import substitute. If, however, the processed product is an export, there is 
a double disadvantage owing to the negative protection of exporting activities. 
(Note that even if there were fully effective drawbacks of duties on protected 
inputsj exporting activities would still have neg +ive net effective protection 
because of the undervaluation of foreign exchange.) On the other hand, if the 
primary commodity is exported, its price also will ue lower because of the 
undervaluation of foreign exchange, so that its processing is at a disadvantage 
only if, and because, it produces a product for export. These results are 
summarized in Table I, where the nature of the bias, if any, is shown in the 
appropriate cell. 
Table I 
Biases Against Processing of Domestic Commodities 
Processed Good 
Export Import Substitute 
& 
I negative protection no bias 
* of exports © 
I both biases undervaluation of 
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The most important case might be that in the upper left-hand corner, 
since if a country has a surplus for export of a primary commodity it is likely 
also to have a potential surplus of the processed product. One can imagine, 
however, cases where both biases are present - e.g., a raw material supply that 
would remain underdeveloped without an export market for a manufacturing 
industry that used it. In any case, however, the bias against exports that is 
inherent in protection of import substitutes is likely to inhibit the develop-
ment of manufacturing based on domestic raw materials. Too often this point 
is missed because attention is focused on the choice between exporting the raw 
material and exporting the processed product. The raw material will be 
exported, however, in either form. The important choice is whether to allocate 
labor and capital to the processing of imported inputs in protected import 
substitution industries or to the processing of domestic raw products for export. 
It is ironic that many LDCs are adding this discrimination against 
the processing of their own primary products to that which comes from the heavy 
protection of processing in the developed countries. When we add wage dualism 
we see that there is a triple bias against processing and in favor of continued 
dependence on primary exports. 
What are the implications for employment from this bias against 
processing? In general we cannot be sure since they turn on the relative factor 
5 
intensities of the alternative industrial mixes. Nevertheless, it seems likely 
that, from the standpoint of both type of industry and location, the processing 
industries might tend to be more labor-intensive than the import-dependent 
import substitution industries. The latter tend to concentrate in large urban 
centers with convenient access to ocean transport. It is in these "import 
enclaves" (as Hirschman has called them) that wage rates are highest and imported 
capital equipment cheapest. Moreover, since these are predominantly industries 
producing locally the same manufactured goods that were formerly imported, 
often by foreign capital or under foreign licensing, there may be a strong bias 
toward the capital-intensive techniques of the developed countries. In contrast, 
the processing industries would tend to be more dispersed in a supply-influenced 
pattern throughout rural and semi-rural areas where wage rates are lower and 
where there would be more participation of local entrepreneurship in the various 
stages from primary production to finished manufacture. 
5 Differences in productivity and saving are also relevant, of course, 
but perhaps less predictable,, 
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Still another adverse influence on k* may come from the context 
within which firms make their investment decisions under protection. If a 
firm feels constrained by the size of the market, rather than by the amount of 
capital at its disposal, it will maximize profits with greater capital intensity 
than it would under an assumed capital constraint. A bias toward import 
substitution behind protection is certainly more likely to create a market 
constraint bias in investment decisions than is an outward-looking industria-
lization strategy. Therefore, this may be another reason to expect slower 
growth of employment under protection. 
I turn, finally, to the balance of payments constraint, itself. 
It was noted above that protection is an inefficient means of attempting to 
improve the trade balance. Indeed, it may turn out in the long run merely to 
prolong the balance of payments constraint. One could simply point to the many 
countries that have had this experience as evidence. In addition, however, I 
think one could argue that it is not really surprising. What the system does 
is to raise steadily the domestic resource cost of saving foreign exchange 
through import substitution. Because of the biases against exports and backward 
integration, the system must move on to less and less comparatively advantageous 
consumption goods industries. It should not surprise us, then, if the process 
ends in both chronic balance of payments difficulties and industrial stagnation. 
It would take a complete reform of the system to open the way for industrial 
exports and backward integration; and yet, at some point, it is only these that 
can both solve the balance of payments problem and permit continuing growth in 
industrial output and employment. 
VI. TOWARD MORE RATIONAL PROTECTION 
Among LDCs there is a general commitment to industrial protection 
as a means of stimulating economic development. Yet the preceding analysis of 
protection and employment suggests a very pessimistic conclusion: protection, 
as it is commonly practiced in many LDCs, appears to be strongly biased against 
the growth of employment. Does this imply that the commitment to protection is 
mistaken - that free trade would represent a better development policy? Or 
does it mean that employment growth must be sacrificed to output growth? 
The answer is, I think, that neither of these implications should 
be drawn. With the right kinds of policies there should be no serious conflict 
between output and employment goals. And there are certainly valid reasons for 
including protection as an element of development policy. What is at fault is 
the typical form that LDC protection systems have taken. In particular, an 
almost exclusive concern with protection of the home market has tended to promote 
what9 years ago in his first report as Director General of UNCTAD, Raul 
Prebisch indicted as "inward-looking industrialization". Since then an 
accumulation of evidence from the experiences of LDCs with protection of the 
home market has underlined Prebisch's indictment. 
What is the alternative? Prebisch urged preferences in the rich 
countries" markets for the manufactures of the poor countries. Others have 
urged trade preferences among LDCs, themselves. While both are desirable, 
both also require difficult international political agreements. It is not 
surprising that such arrangements have been slow to materialize. What an 
individual country might accomplish more quickly is the reform of its own 
protection system. While it is not possible here to give more than a very 
brief indication of what I would suggest as guidelines for such reform, these 
7 have been spelled out in greater detail in an article cited above. 
Principally what is required is to find ways of meeting the 
legitimate aims of protection - such as encouraging infant industries, reward-
ing for external economies, offsetting wage dualism and correcting for terms 
of trade effects - that avoid the biases against exports, backward integration, 
and the use of labor, that are inherent in the protection systems typically 
fo-tnd in LDCs. The key to accomplishing this is the use of subsidies to 
pro/ide protection, in place of tariffs or other import restriction. This is 
not a new argument, of course. It has long been recognized that subsidies 
could provide protection superior to tariff protection if some relatively 
neutral means of financing the subsidies could be found. However, given the 
weaknesses of tax systems in LDCs and their heavy dependence on tariffs for 
revenue, it has seemed easy to defend tariff protection on practical grounds. 
I should admit that this was my own view some years ago. There 
are two reasons why I am no longer willing to accept this defense of tariff 
protection. First, I have become convinced from the recent studies in many 
countries of protection in relation to development that the disadvantages of 
tariff protection have been greatly underestimated in the past. Second, I now 
think that there is a relatively simple means open to LDCs of financing the 
subsidies required for more effective protection. It depends on using tariffs 
for revenue, but not for protection. This is accomplished by neutralizing the 
protective effect with domestic sales taxes - ideally a value added tax. The 
6 Towards a New Trade Policy for Developing Countries (U-w-, 1964)0 
7 "The Role of Protection in Industrialization Policy", op. cit. 
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latter, in turn, would augment the generation of revenue and help to avoid 
the common problem of a low income elasticity of tax revenue that plagues LDCs 
heavily dependent on tariffs. Protection, then, comes not from tariffs, "but 
from subsidies. 
A capsule description of such a scheme would be something like 
the following. First, there should be a -uniform tariff, partly offset by a 
•uniform value added tax. The difference between the two would represent a 
level of protection justified by general terms of trade considerations. These 
exclude the effects from major exports, which would be subject to export taxes 
to remedy such disparities between world prices and marginal revenue as are 
judged to exist. The absolute levels of tariff and value added tax would 
depend on the revenue needs of the government, though another consideration is 
enforcement. An exception to the uniformity rule could be higher duties and 
domestic % axes on luxury consumption goods. Exports would be exempt from the 
value added tax and, therefore, treated on a par with import substitutes, 
except for the slight terms of trade differential. Subsidies would be used 
to protect "infants" for a terminal period, as well as to reward for external 
economies where they could be clearly diagnosed. Subsidies to employment would 
be used to correct the effects of wage dualism. A single exchange rate would 
be adjusted to provide balance of payments equilibrium,, 
The above is a very simple system, much easier to manage than most 
present systems in LDCs. The combination of uniform tariff with uniform value 
added tax would not only be easy to administer it could also raise the revenue 
needed to provide for the various subsidies without any of the distorting 
effects of tariff protection. In particular, it would eliminate the various 
biases against employment that were identified above. 


